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The Avant-Projet of the French Law Obligations and the
French Law of Prescriptions, which we will cite as the Projet-
Catala,' is a monumental undertaking to modernize Parts III and
IV of Book Three of the French Civil Code, "Obligations," and to
continue the work of Jean Carbonnier who demonstrated "in
transfiguring the first Book" that it was possible to "rehabilitate"
the Code of 1804 "without damaging its structure or form."'2 "The
program mobilized thirty-four persons" 3 under the sponsorship of
the Association Henri Capitant and was presented in the form of a
"Rapport A Monsieur le Garde des Sceaux' 4 in September 2005. A
few months later, this draft of the Projet-Catala was sent to several
foreign comparative law scholars throughout the world for the dual
purpose of translating it, if possible, into their national languages
and, on that occasion, to contribute their comments, observations,
and remarks as they considered appropriate, especially as regards
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FRENCH LAW OBLIGATIONS AND THE FRENCH LAW OF PRESCRIPTIONS (2005).
3. Id.
4. Translation: "Report to the Keeper of the Seals."
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the content of this preliminary draft of a law that could become
incorporated into the French Civil Code, should it be approved by
the French Parliament.
These foreign comparative law scholars were advised that, in
fulfilling their tasks, the authors of the Preliminary Draft had not
been motivated by any "plan ... to oppose that which is or
anything of what should be the idea of the Civil Law" and that "the
modernization of the Civil Code will continue as the hub of private
law, the sturdy trunk of a tree whose branches can stretch out
without losing their strength" so that the modern Civil Code
becomes "the natural recourse of the judge faced with the silence
of statutes and conventions, the pool of our legal reason."5 The
instructions received informed us that "the Projet-Catala does not
propose a breaking of the Code, but an adjustment" and that "it
(the Projet) is supportive of doctrine and jurisprudence."
These goals were made clear to all, among the comparativists,
two sets of scholars were asked to undertake an English translation
of the Projet: one set of English legal scholars trained in the
Common Law of England and two Louisiana scholars6 trained both
in the common law and in the civil law, both totally fluent in the
French language of the projet Catala as well as in the English
language of the translated version of that projet.
The focus of this Article is to express the reasons why a
translation of the French Civil Law of Obligations into the English
language is an undertaking that can only be assigned to those who
have experienced the "civil law in English," i.e., Louisiana legal
scholars. The legal system of Louisiana is one of a handful in the
world in which the civil law is practiced in English as a matter of
routine. The success of this experience, now 200 years old,
illustrates that the Louisiana legal professions have found a way to
shape the English language of the common law to fit the civil law
of the State. The fundamental issue that the reader will be juggling
throughout this Article is whether, on the one hand, the translation
of civil law concepts into English Common Law words and
5. CATALA, supra note 2. For the civilians called to translate the Projet,
this unity of purpose was seen as a guiding line rather than a directive. The
number of languages into which the Projet would be translated evoked these
reflections from Denis Mazeaud: "[T]his could mean that [creating a European
unity of contract] constitutes an impossible mission because of the linguistic
diversity of the members of the Land6 Commission. Since the law is also a
language, a unity of contract does not imply a linguistic unity of those who
conceive it." Denis Mazeaud, Un droit europgen en quote d'identitg. Les
Principes du droit europden du contrat, RECuEiL DALLOZ 2959 (2007) (Fr.).
6. Professors Alain. A. Levasseur, LSU Law Center (Baton Rouge, La.),
and David W. Gruning, Loyola University Law School (New Orleans, La.).
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concepts can become an accurate reflection and transposition of
the essence of civil law concepts or whether, on the other hand, the
Louisiana Civil Law expressed in its natural English "garment" has
not already created the natural and only proper legal language to
accomplish the goals of the Projet Catala and of the "Instructions."
In other words, can there exist two different English versions of
one and the same civil law text? The conclusion we have reached,
and that we hope will be convincing, is that the legal linguistic
vocabulary of an English-written civil law has been in existence in
Louisiana for the last 200 years and that there is no need to resort
to the legal vocabulary found in the Common Law of England to
express the "civil law in English." Actually, we are issuing a
strong warning against any such attempt. The survival of the civil
law system in the English language of the Louisiana Civil Code
since 1808 is a vivid testimony that the civil law can exist in
"English" as long as it is an English that has been tested and tried
in a civil law environment.
II. THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OR DIGEST OF 1808: Two HUNDRED
YEARS OF CIVIL LAW IN ENGLISH
A brief history of the civil law in Louisiana will help illustrate,
on the one hand, the very close interrelationship that exists
between a legal culture and the legal language that serves as its
external manifestation and, on the other hand, the dilemma facing a
translator caught between the political and legal languages of the
issuing legal culture and the target legal culture.
A. History
The year 1682 marked the beginning of the official presence of
France on the immense territorial expanse from the shores of the
Gulf of Mexico to the Great Lakes. A royal edict of 14 September
1712, entrusted the economic exploitation of the royal colony,
Louisiana, named in honor of King Louis XIV, to Antoine Crozat
and placed it under the legal rule of the Coutume de Paris. By
Letters Patent of December 18, 1717, a High Council for the
colony was entrusted with the administration of the Coutume as
well as the Civil and Criminal Ordinances of 1667 and 1670. The
procedure then in effect before the courts was that of the ChAtelet
in Paris. In that same year, 1717, the Compagnie des Indes
assumed operation of the colony. Financial difficulties forced the
Compagnie to return the administration of the colony to the
2009]
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crown.7 On November 3, 1762, the King of France ceded the
territory of Louisiana to his cousin, the King of Spain, by means of
the "secret" Treaty of Fontainebleau. The Treaty of Paris of 1763
officially confirmed the transfer of Louisiana to Spain. The news
of this transfer was not very well received by the French
inhabitants of Louisiana who were very apprehensive about what
would become of their forms of government, their laws, and their
customs. During this same period of time there was a wave of
"forced" immigration of several hundred Acadians from the
Canadian province of Nova Scotia or Acadia who had fled to
Louisiana after being forced from their lands by British troops. The
first Spanish Governor of Louisiana, Don Antonio de Ulloa, was
very badly received by his French subjects and had to leave the
territory in great haste after the Legislative Council voted his
expulsion from Louisiana in October of 1768. The Spanish
government resorted to drastic measures sending an expeditionary
force to deal with the rebels. Once order was restored, the new
Governor, General Alexander O'Reilly, began a thorough reform
of the administrative, military, and judicial structures of the
colony.8
On November 25, 1769, O'Reilly created the "cabildo for the
administration of justice and to keep order" and declared that he
had "thought useful and even necessary to make a summary or
regulation from those Spanish laws.., until a better knowledge of
the Spanish language can help all by the reading of these laws
above, to deepen their knowledge in the details ......
Time [would] bring with it familiarity [with Spanish law]
and before the end of the first decade, the French
inhabitants and the Spanish legal system had become
friends, the people found that, after all, . . . the difference
(with the laws of Spain) was not so much that it could
justify their first reaction of disgust to the change . . . of
system.
9
On October 1, 1801, by the Treaty of St. Ildephonso, Spain
agreed to transfer Louisiana to Napoleon, who ceded it to the
7. From 1731 until 1762.
8. See generally CHARLES GAYARRE, HISTOIRE DE LA LOUISIANE (1846-
1847); CHARLES GAYARRE, HISTORY OF LOUISIANA (2d ed. 1879); MARCEL
GIRAUX, HISTOIRE DE LA LOuIsIANE FRANCAISE (1953-1954); FRANOIS
XAVIER MARTIN, THE HISTORY OF LOuIsIANA, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD
(1882); Henry Plauch6 Dart, Sr., The Legal Institutions of Louisiana, 2 LA. HIST.
Q. 72 passim (1918).
9. Henry Plauch6 Dart, Sr., Colonial Legal System of Arkansas, Louisiana,
and Texas, 56 REP. OF LA. B. ASS'N 24 (1926).
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United States in accordance with the Treaty of Paris of April 1803.
The United States took possession of the territory on December 30,
1803, and installed William C. Claiborne as the first territorial
Governor. On March 26, 1804, the United States Congress passed
an act "for the organization of the Territory of Orleans and the
District of Louisiana.' 10 A provision of that act stated that "the
laws in effect in the said territory at the beginning of the
implementation of this act and which are not incompatible with its
provisions, will continue to have effect, until amended, modified or
abolished by the legislature."" In place of the words "laws in
effect," one should read "Spanish law," which had been the official
law of Louisiana since 1769. The conflict was then opened
between the language of the law, Spanish, and the language of
communication, English.
An editorial published in The Louisiana Gazette, November 9,
1804, defined very clearly the positions of the partisans engaged in
a confrontation that had just begun:
[B]y the treaty ceding Louisiana to the U.S., Louisiana
obtained the right to be incorporated into the Union. From
that moment on, Louisiana should be considered as the point
of departure for many other states to be assimilated, from all
points of view and as much as possible, similar to all its
sister states. In all other states the law is based on the
Common Law of England .... Spanish laws are, in general,
excellent because they are based on the Roman Code, one of
the most perfect and pure of legal systems ever given to the
world .... I recognize that the introduction of the English
language will provoke some inconveniences. But would
these inconveniences not be felt if the French language
should be recognized to the exclusion of all others? Those
whose mother tongue is English, even though they now
represent a small portion of the population, will form in a
few years the majority of the population. Is it not wise to
start with a gradual introduction of this language, which will
become the common language of the country in the interest
of all?' 2
In order to prevent any possible intrusion of the common law
under the pretense of the use of English, on March 22, 1806, the
Legislative Council and the Chamber of Representatives of the
10. The Territory of Orleans, in 9 THE TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1803-1812 202 passim (1934).
11. Id.at210.
12. Editorial, THE LA. GAZETTE (New Orleans, La.), Nov. 9, 1804.
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Territory of Orleans declared "which laws [would] continue [to] be
in force in the Territory of Orleans and those scholars who can be
referred to as authorities on the laws of the same territory.' 3 The
members of the two Assemblies made clear that the law in effect
was Spanish law and that the scholars considered as authorities
were not only the cited Spanish Scholars but also Domat and
Pothier. In response to the strong position taken by the Assemblies,
Governor Claiborne vetoed this Resolution. Immediately, the
Assemblies declared their dissolution, but not without first drafting
a "Manifest" as a plea intended to highlight the values of their
legal culture and to underscore the commitment of the francophone
population to the civil law. 14 Carried away by their fervor and
resolute in their aim to enforce the will of the people, the members
of the "dissolved" Assemblies met again with the sole aim of
adopting a resolution to empower two attorneys, James Brown and,
especially, Louis Moreau Lislet, with the drafting and organization
of a Civil Code. These two lawyers were instructed to "take as the
basis of the prescribed Code, the civil laws actually governing the
Territory ....,,1 The Governor gave in. On March 31, 1808, the
Assemblies endorsed the outcome of the work of Brown and
Moreau Lislet under the form of a "Digest of the Civil Laws now
in effect in the Territory of Orleans."
16
B. The Digest or Code of 1808: Language of Policy, Legal
Language, and Legal Culture
Excerpts from the Manifest of May 1806 will serve to illustrate
the challenge that the people of Louisiana in the 1800s faced to
ensure the survival of its legal culture in a geographic and political
environment that continued to tilt towards the common law, riding
the powerful wave of the English language. The latter had become
the language of national policy and was to become the common
language of the State. Due to historical, political, and social events,
the civil law and the common law were forced to cohabitate as the
two dominant legal traditions on the American continent as early
as the first quarter of the nineteenth century.
With the passage of time, the "Manifest" allows us to assess,
with some degree of speculation, another aspect of the cohabitation
of the two major legal traditions in the "social laboratory" of the
13. The Territory of Orleans, supra note 10, at 649.
14. Editorial, LE TELEGRAPHE-NOUVELLE ORLEANS, June 3, 1806.
15. AcTS PASSED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FIRST LEGISLATURE OF THE
TERRITORY OF ORLEANS 214 (Bradford & Anderson eds., 1807).
16. The Territory of Orleans, supra note 10, at 780-81.
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Louisiana experience. That aspect of the cohabitation can be
identified in the legal translation of the civil law into the language
of the common law. As any experiment conducted in a laboratory,
this one was hard fought.
1. The "Manifest" and the Legal Culture of the Civil Law in
the Louisiana of 1808
The General Assembly issued its "Manifest" to give the
citizens of Louisiana the reasons for its resolution to "dissolve
immediately" on May 26, 1806, after Governor Claiborne had
affixed his veto to the declaration of March 22, 1806, on the laws
in effect in the Territory of Orleans. Foremost among the reasons
the members of the Assembly put forward was the wisdom of the
United States Congress in allowing Louisiana to maintain its own
laws while ensuring that the laws of Louisiana were not in conflict
with that of other states. 17 This "Manifest" was more than an
expression of an intellectual or spiritual attachment to the letter of
the civil law. It was, undeniably, a plea arising from the depth of
the heart of the people of Louisiana. It was an emotional statement
by the people of Louisiana that it had a visceral attachment to its
legal culture and that that culture was itself the creation of a
fortuitous melange of other moral, social, psychological, and
religious cultures. To open the Louisiana legal system to the
English language and the common law would have been like
erasing with the stroke of a pen more than 100 years of the history
of a people.
An attempt to settle these issues took the form of the
"comprehensive collection of laws that govern us" which was
written and published in March 1808 as a "Digest of the Civil
Laws .... ,,18 Written in French, this Digest or Code was
subsequently translated into English. We will focus here on the
English text to assess the accuracy of the relationship between the
language used to translate into English unique legal concepts that
are identified with the legal culture of the civil law. Because of the
history of the civil law in Louisiana, it will be proper and
necessary to include Spanish law, as well as Roman law, in our
assessment in addition to the culture, the principles, and the rules
of French law as it existed at that time, i.e., as a twin sister of
17. See Extract from the Meeting of the Legislative Council on May 26, 1806,
THE TELEGRAPH (New Orleans, La.), June 31, 1806 (for the complete text of the
"Manifest"). See also The Territory of New Orleans, supra note 10, at 643 passim.
18. See ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR WITH VIcEN(i FELI0, MOREAU LISLET: THE
MAN BEHIND THE DIGEST OF 1808 (2008).
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Spanish and Roman law. 19 However simple in its presentation, the
question masks a great difficulty. In our attempt at elaborating our
response, we have had to bring together and reconcile many
component parts that are situated at different levels in the
existential reality and outward expression of the law. Indeed, we
have on the one hand a language, or natural and necessary vehicle
of transmission (English in this case), and, on the other hand, the
legal culture of the civil law which has for centuries borrowed or
ridden totally different vehicles of transmission, i.e., different
languages, such as Spanish, French, and Latin in our case. The
obvious question is, therefore, the following: can an "old" legal
culture, the civil law, preserve its integrity and authenticity if
"disguised" in a new expression, that of the language of
transmission of a much "younger" legal culture, the common law?
Placed in the context of Louisiana in the 1800s, the question
becomes: did the English language "translation" of the Digest or
Civil Code of 1808 remain faithful to the "old" legal culture of the
civil law when it was couched under the form of a "legal" English
language presumably specific to the civil law of Louisiana and,
therefore, necessarily distinct from the legal English of the
''younger" legal culture of the common law?
2. The English Language and the Civil Law Legal Culture of
the Louisiana Codes of 1808 and 1825
In their "Preliminary Report" of 1823 on the Draft Civil Code
of Louisiana of 1825,20 the three reporters did hint that if "certain
parts of the Digest of 1808 raised questions of interpretation, it is
mainly due to the fact of the incorrect translation or the mistakes
that are inevitable in a work that was composed in haste."
21
These errors, as the examples below will illustrate, were errors
either of grammar, punctuation, or, more seriously, terminology.
All these types of errors are well known to the translator who must
avoid sometimes anglicisms, sometimes refuse copying or
borrowing, not succumb to the temptation to paraphrase
19. Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources
and Present Relevance, 46 TuL. L. REv. 4 (1971). Professor Batiza concludes in
his examination of the "letter" of the articles of the Digest that 85% of those
articles are of French origin. See also LEVASSEUR WITH FELIU, supra note 18.
20. LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES, 2 A REPUBLICATION OF THE PRELIMINARY
REPORT OF THE CODE COMMISSIONERS OF FEBRUARY 13, 1823 (1937).
21. The translation into English was criticized in the Preliminary Report of
the Code Commissioners of February 13, 1823: "[S]ome parts have given rise to
questions of construction .... arisen either from a faulty translation, or. . . ." Id.
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from other legal and administrative texts, avoid the use of
neologisms to find an equivalent in the target language, or
should rewrite or simply reformulate an idea so as to
respect the syntax and style of each language. To do this,
the translator should in turn become a philologist,
grammarian, terminologist, editor, in addition to having the
knowledge of the specific material to complete the
transaction of translating.22
Above all, Anglo-Saxon legal texts are usually
characterized by the length of their sentences. It is not rare to
find . . . sentences reaching 10 or 15 lines . . . . To
complicate matters even more, punctuation is often lacking
in texts written in English: it is obvious that Anglo-Saxon
drafters are less inclined to emphasize punctuation than their
French peers, who are more accustomed to handling the
comma, an item which they consider essential to the
organization of their ideas .... English, as everyone knows,
is a synthetic and elliptical language whose suppleness is
often the sources of great difficulties for the francophone
translator, who is used to a style of language that is more
articulate and analytic. These difficulties are compounded in
the case of legal English where, in addition to current
structures of the language, the English drafter makes use of
numerous terms of art, constructions, and figures of style
that are particular to the language of the law.
23
Regarding the ellipse which is manifested in the English
language mainly in the usage of compound words (e.g.), it
is a characteristic feature of English .... Less articulated
than French, the English speaker can make use of some
bridge-words where the French speaker needs to punctuate
his reasoning. Aided in this manner by strictly linguistic
factors, the ellipse is still favored by the Anglo-Saxon
mind, which often prefers to suggest an understanding
where the French must make it explicit.24
22. Jean-Claude Gemar, Fonctions de la traduction juridique en milieu
bilingue el langage du droit au Canada, in LANGUE DU DROr ET TRADUCTION:
ESSAIS DE JURILINGUISTIQUE 130 (1982) (Fr.).
23. FREDERIC HOUBERT, GUIDE PRATIQUE DE LA TRADUCTION JURIDIQUE 46




visited Apr. 10, 2009).
24. HENRI VAN HOOF, TRADUIRE L'ANGLAIS 39 (1989) (Fr.).
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In regard to the translation of the "whole" of a legal concept
from one language into another, it is clear that
English law ... is composed of legal concepts within which
the rules of Law are structured, and take their value. But, and
this is the great originality of English law, the concepts of
the Common Law, which when used by English lawyers are
not the same concepts as those of French law .... The basic
concepts of French law ... often seem either not to exist or
have in English law a second order of importance .... The
concepts of English law are different from those of French
law, and there is not, and there cannot exist, a satisfactory
corresponding vocabulary to translate into French words the
English legal language or conversely to translate into
English the words used by French scholars .... ,25
Some examples of mistakes and bad translations taken from the
law of obligations of the French text of the Digest and its English
version will illustrate the difficulties of translating a text of an
originating and controlling legal culture into the language of a
target legal culture or culture of arrival.
Let us take first examples of mistakes in the structure of the
articles or mistakes of punctuation.
The French version of Article 2, Book III, Title III of the Code
of 1808 was as follows: "Le contrat est Synallagmatic ou bilat6ral,
lorsque les contractants s'obligent r6ciproquement les uns envers
les autres." 26 Article 3 stated that a contract "est unilateral,
lorsqu'une ou plusieurs personnes sont obligdes, envers une ou
plusieurs autres sans que de la part de ces dernires il y ait
d'engagement. 997 The English versions were as follows: Article 2
"A contract is synallagmatic or bilateral, when . . . ." Article 3: "It
is unilateral, when one or more persons ....,,28 In the 1825 Code
there is some change in the order of articles and a change in words
used. Thus, Articles 1 and 2 of Book III, Title III of the Code of
1808 were merged into a single article, 1758, in the Code of 1825.
This article 1758 was preceded by a kind of introduction, which we
can assume was designed to differentiate the concept of contract in
25. RENE DAVID, TRAITE ELtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL COMPARE 282-83
(1950) (Fr.).
26. "The contract is synallagmatic or bilateral, when the contracting parties
reciprocally obligate themselves to each other." LA. DIG. art. 2, at 260 (1808)
(emphasis added).
27. "It is unilateral, when one or more persons have entered into an
obligation towards one or more other persons, without the latter's being under
any engagement." LA. CIV CODE art. 3 (1808) (emphasis added).
28. See supra notes 26-27 for complete English version of both articles.
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the civil law from that of the same concept at common law. Indeed
this article was thus drafted in its French version:
A tout contrat, il faut qu'il y ait au moins deux parties, l'une
desquelles fait ou s'oblige A faire ou A ne pas faire quelque
chose, et I'autre envers laquelle l'engagement est pris. Si
celle-ci ne s'oblige A rien express~ment, le contrat est appel6
unilateral m~me dans le cas oAf la loi attache certaines
obligations A son acceptation. Le contrat est appel6 bilateral
ou r6ciproque, lorsque les parties s'engagent mutuellement
quelque chose d'une mani~re expresse.
It is important to point out here the reversal in the treatment of
the "bilateral" or "reciprocal" contract (and not "synallagmatic or
bilateral") in contrast with the unilateral contract. The reason for
the reversal was most likely because of the fundamental difference
between the nature and legal regime of the "unilateral contract" at
common law and the nature and legal regime of that contract at
civil law. "Unilateral" at common law and "unilateral" at civil law
had become "faux-amis!"
Another example taken from the Civil Code of 1825 deals with
old article 1934 about the nature of damages. The French version
of that article was very clear and well balanced. But an error of
punctuation, the addition of prepositions and adjectives, and the
elimination of certain words in the English version have led the
Louisiana courts to give an interpretation, and necessarily an
application, to that article that was contrary to the foundations of
the French version of that same article.
The French version of the third paragraph of article 1934 read:
Lorsque le contrat a pour but de procurer d quelqu'un une
jouissance purement intellectuelle, telle que celles qui
tiennent A la religion, A la morale, au gofit, A la commodit6
ou A tout autre espce de satisfaction de ce genre, quoique
ces choses n'aient pas W appr6ci6es en argent par les
parties, des dommages n'en seront pas moins dus pour la
violation de la convention .... 3o
29. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1758 (1825), providing:
In every contract, there must be at least two parts, one which does or
undertakes to do or not do something, and the other to which the
commitment is made. If this party does not expressly agree to the
contract, it is called unilateral even if the law attaches certain obligations
to its acceptance. The contract is called bilateral or reciprocal when the
parties mutually agree to something expressly.
30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1928 (1825), providing:
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The English version became: ". . . Where the contract has for
its object the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment, whether
in religion, morality or taste, or some convenience or other legal
gratification, although these are not appreciated in money by the
parties, yet damages are due for their breach; . . . ."31 The
Louisiana jurisprudence, relying solely on the English version of
this article, has never given the English words "some other legal
convenience or gratification" the meaning that the French words
"tout autre esp~ce de satisfaction de ce genre" (any other kind of
satisfaction of this kind) would give "a purely intellectual
enjoyment" that a party to a convention could draw from religion,
morality. . . .In other words, Louisiana's courts have given no
"intellectual and moral damages" for breach of a contract except
where the parties had expressly provided for such damages.
32
Let us now consider some examples from the translation of
concepts. Where "basic concepts of French law" did not exist in
the common law or where these concepts could not be translated
into words out of the legal language of the common law, the
translators of the Civil Codes of Louisiana of 1808 and 1825 did
not hesitate to use the vocabulary of civil law concepts to give to
the "translated text" the full content of the civil law legal culture
with which those concepts were identified.
The examples we have chosen are intended to demonstrate that
there exists, and has always existed, a continuity in the use of an
"English" legal vocabulary of the Civil Law. The jurisdictions that
have been the creators and promoters of the civil law in English are
the State of Louisiana and the Province of Quebec. They are the
models of yesterday that we have followed today in our English
translation of the Avant-Projet Catala.
Because of its importance in the culture of the civil law, our
first example of a civil law concept is that of "solidaritg." Article
When the contract is designed to provide a purely intellectual
enjoyment, such as those things relating to religion, morality, taste,
convenience or any other kind of satisfaction of this kind, although
these things have not been appreciated in money by the parties,
damages will not be less due to the violation of the convention.
31. Authors' note: The important differences in the two versions of the
article are italicized.
32. In 1984 Louisiana Legislators added an article, article 1998, which deals




97 of the Civil Code of 1808 3 3 and article 2083 of the Civil Code
of 1825 stated that "l'obligation est solidaire . . . ." Article 100 of
the same Code of 180834 and article 2086 of the same Code of
1825 stated that "il y a solidaritd de la part des drbiteurs ..... The
English versions, translated from the French, of those same articles
used the term "in solido" wherever these articles referred to
solidarity, except in one single article of the Code of 1825, article
2088, 35 which stated that "the obligation is in solido, or joint and
several between the creditors ...... An asterisk following the word
"several" tells us that "or joint and several" did not have a
counterpart in the French text. There is no doubt that this addition
is an anomaly because no other reference to "joint and several" is
found anywhere in the other articles on solidarity. Furthermore,
this English expression "joint and several" appears in one article
out of four under the title of "rules which govern obligations
between creditors in solido." It does not appear in either the title
on solidary obligations between debtors or in the texts of the
sixteen articles listed under this title. Yet, isn't this solidarity
between debtors the most common and most important form of
solidarity? Is it sufficient, and therefore acceptable, for one single
use of the common law legal expression "joint and several" to
become "the" alternative to the civil law concept of solidarity? The
Civil Code of Louisiana today refers only to "solidary
obligations 36 and to "solidarity.
3 7
Other concepts of the civil law should be briefly mentioned
here because their true identity has been faithfully respected in the
translation from the French legal language of the Codes of 1808
and 1825 into the official English legal language of the same
Codes.38 Since we are making comparisons between, on one hand,
the "legal French" and the "legal English" of the Civil Codes of
Louisiana and, on the other, the legal French and the two "legal"
English translations of the Avant-Projet Catala, we have
intentionally chosen concepts that are found in the texts of the
Civil Codes of Louisiana and in the text of the Avant-Projet. In
other words, we have taken as models the "civil law in English" of
the Louisiana (and Qudbec) civil codes to translate into English a
civil law text written in French, the Avant-Projet Catala.
33. LA. DIG. art. 97, at 279 (1808). Authors' note: The articles of the Code
of 1808 are re-numbered from 1 at the beginning of each of the Titles of its three
Books, hence the need to cite the page in which each article is found.
34. LA. DIG. art. 100, at 279.
35. This article is not found in the Civil Code of 1808.
36. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1790, 1794 (2008).
37. See, e.g., id. arts. 1796, 1802.
38. We will look at the Louisiana and Qudbec English versions.
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One first concept we have identified is that of "terme" used by
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 in its French version of article
85:39 "le terme diff~re de la condition ... ." The English text states
that "the term differs from the condition ... " The same is true of
the Civil Code of 1825.4°
The second concept, that of "cause," has a slightly more hectic
path. In the Civil Code of 1808, the word "cause" is not found in
the French version of the articles on "Essential conditions for the
validity of Conventions.' In the English version of these articles,
the word 'Rpurpose" can be found in article 8.42 But the title of
Section IV is "Of The Cause" and the three articles which make
up this Section only use "cause." In the Civil Code of 1825, the
word "cause" is used in the French text of article 1779 while the
word "purpose" is used in the English version. The title of Section
IV has become in English: "Of the Cause or Consideration of
Contracts" and the articles of this Section, in their English version,
use the word "cause" only.44 It is later in article 1896, where
"cause" is defined, that the word "consideration" appears. But,
interestingly enough, the French version of this article uses the
word "considration." It is obvious that the word "consideration,"
with the acute accent, is used in its own legal and original sense in
the civil law as is demonstrated very well by the definition given:
"On entend par la cause du contrat dont il est fait mention dans cette
section, la considdration ou le motif qui a engag6 A contracter. On
dit qu'un contrat est sans cause . . . ." The English version has
transposed the word from the French word "considgration" into an
English word containing a common law legal tone: "By the cause of
the contract, in this section, is meant, the consideration or motive for
making it, and a contract is said to be without a cause... ." How is
it possible not to understand that the words "consideration" and
"motive" had the same content, meaning, and legal value in the
civil law, especially when they are placed in the context of
39. LA. DIG. art. 85, at 277.
40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2046 (1825). In addition, article 2048 of the 1825
Code defines "terme" and "term." In the present Civil Code of Louisiana the
English word "term" is used. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE art. 1777 (2008). In the
British English version of the Projet, the French legal word "terme" is translated as
"[a] delay point." See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1185-1191 (1825). In the Louisiana
civil law English version of the Projet the same concept is translated as "term."
The Spanish/Colombian version of the Projet uses "el tgrmino" and the Italian
version uses "termine." The Civil Code of Qu6bec uses the French word "terme"
and the English word "term." See, e.g., QUt. CIV. CODE art. 1508 (2009).
41. See LA. DIG. 260, 264 (1808) (Fr.).
42. LA. DIG. art. 8, at 260.
43. Id. at 264.
44. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1893-1895 (1825).
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contracts without "consideration" in the common law sense of this
concept? The same French word "consideration" could not possibly
have two opposite meanings in the same sentence within the same
article. One needs only to read article 1897 to realize that: "The
contract is also considered to be without cause .... According to
this rule; a donation that may be made in consideration of a future
marriage is void, if the marriage does not occur." One cannot help
but notice the repetition of the words "considered" and
"consideration." The present Civil Code of Louisiana makes use
not only of the word "cause" itself, but more importantly also of its
legal content as defined in article 1967-1 in this form: "Cause is
the reason why a party obligates himself." An unofficial
commentary which appears under this article adds that in this
article, "cause is not consideration." Louisiana Civil Law has
remained faithful to the historical concept of "cause" of the civil
law, and it still exists today in the French Civil Code, the Quebec
Civil Code, and the Argentinean Civil Code. It remains a concept
"common" to many civil law jurisdictions. 45
Another concept mentioned in our English version of the
Avant-Projet Catala and in the French text of the same Avant-
Projet is the concept of "violence." In both the French and English
versions of the Louisiana Civil Codes of 1808 and 1825, the legal
concept of violence is reflected in the same French word
"violence." That French word has been carried over into the
English text under the same English word "violence." The legal
context surrounding this word has been a part of the Civil Law of
46Louisiana since 1808. Unfortunately, and unwisely, the
legislative reform of 1984 substituted the English word "duress"
for the French and English "legal" word "violence" in the
contemporary edition of the Civil Code of Louisiana.47 Whatever
45. At common law "consideration is something at once sought by the
promise in exchange for its promise and paid for by the recipient of this promise
in exchange for it. This thing or consideration must have a monetary value but
the amount is a condition of validity of the consideration. The fundamental
difference between the concept of cause in French law and English law of the
consideration is enhanced by the existence of two forms derived from the
consideration that are 'detrimental reliance,' especially in American law, and
'promissory estoppel."' See ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, LE CONTRAT EN DROIT
AMERIcAIN 41-49 (1996) (Fr.); Alain A. Levasseur, La Louisiane: Un Vaisseau a
la Derive?, in LE PLURIJURIDISME, ACTES DU 8EME CONGRES DE L'ASSOCIATION
INTERNATIONALE DE METHODOLOGIE JURIDIQUE 257-77 (2005) (Fr.).
46. It is appropriate to add here that the "English" legal word "tort" is only
the "old law-French word tort" which referred to any kind of legal injury (from
the Latin "injuria"). JOHN HAMILTON BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY 336 (2d ed. 1979).
47. LA. C1V. CODE arts. 1959-1964 (2008).
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the reasons that motivated the change in "words, ' 48 substituting
one English word, "violence," with another English word,
"duress," has brought about a major change in the actual legal
content of that vice or defect of consent. As explained below,
"violence" in the civil law is not the equivalent or mirror image of
"duress" in the common law; to translate one for the other is to
affect the essence or content of the civil law legal concept of
"violence."
"Lesion" remains "lesion" in English and was "lsion" in the
French text of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825. 49 In the
contemporary, all English Louisiana Civil Code, the original
French word "lMsion" remains "lesion."50
"Compensation," in the French version of the Civil Codes of
1808 and 1825, remained "compensation" in the English
translations of the relevant articles of these Codes.51 The word and
the concept of "compensation" remain in use in the present
Louisiana Civil Code. 5P
"Confusion" in the present Civil Code53 was "confusion" in the
French and English versions of the Civil Codes of 1808 and 1825.
These examples of concepts of truly civil law origin and
identity have remained engraved in English words for two
centuries now. The same examples should suffice to prove that
concepts or institutions of the civil law can preserve their
traditional legal value and culture although "exteriorized" in a
legal vocabulary borrowed from a foreign language, English in
particular. It can be done provided that the translator wisely
chooses to give preference to the internal and substantial content of
the concept rather than to its external and literal form. It must not
be forgotten that
the authority of a law or statute by the simple fact that it
should apply "erga omnes" imposes an obligation to
achieve a flawless translation. Such is necessary to avoid
later disputes on the inconsistency of terms. In the
48. The commentary tells us that there is equivalence and that the word
"duress" is a term of art or a technical word of the English language that means
exactly what is implicit in the words "violence or threats." Id. art. 1959 cmt. b.
The commentary added that the adoption of the word duress does not need to
include concepts that are incompatible with its meaning. Id. We can see nothing
but bad faith in these double-speak explanations!
49. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1860-1880 (1825).
50. LA. CrV. CODE art. 1965 (2008).
51. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2203-2204 (1825).
52. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1893-1902 (2008).
53. Id. arts. 1903-1905; LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2214-2215 (1825); LA. DIG.
arts. 200-201, at 300 (1808).
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operation of translation, the choice between the spirit and
the letter of the law results from the constraints of a
language on the one hand and the required fidelity to a text
on the other hand. We must respect the form and content of
the original text.
54
The "Legal-Scholars/Translators" of the Louisiana Civil Codes
of 1808 and 1825, because of their "natural and genetic" up-
bringing, so to speak, as comparativists and linguists and given the
legal and linguistic environment in which they worked,
instinctively and quite naturally made this message of wisdom
their modus operandi and their moral guide. The same "Legal-
Scholars/Translators" lived the reality of their time and felt the
sensitivity of their environment through their awareness that
[T]he terms of exclusive legal provenance are in reality
technical terms that fulfill a very precise function in the
language of law. . . Because each legal system has its own
history and its own peculiarities, we must never translate
when the term has no direct equivalent and is not
immediately recognizable in the target language .... One
must therefore translate only when it is possible to do so
without transposing from one country to another, from one
system to another .... 55
Thus, throughout its history, Louisiana has experienced what
some would call the "coexistence," and others the "confrontation,"
of the inevitable tension that is created between language and law
and between political language and legal language.56 This
experience has made Louisiana capable of reaching for "[t]hat
which seals the need of kinship between law and language, be it
the mediation of a third term, a nurturing environment that
accompanies their development, a word, the culture from which
they spring." For Louisiana,
law and language are cultural facts .... When a law born
in a language is transposed to another, the equality of the
two versions will never be greater than that of the natural
affinity that exists between the law and its language of birth
... ; the success of the transposition is an achievement of
54. Jean-Marc Kieffer, Le Traducteur "Jurilinguiste," in FRANQAIS
JURIDIQUE ET SCIENCE DU DRorr 227-29 (1995) (Fr.).
55. HOUBERT, supra note 23, at 22, 37.
56. See Alain A. Levasseur, Langue Politique, Langue Lggale? Les
Tribulations du Civiliste Louisianais, in FRANQAIs JuRIDIQUE ET SCIENCE DU
DRorr 233 (1995) (Fr.); Editorial, LE COURRIER DE LA LouIsiANE (New
Orleans, La.), May 16, 1821 (cited in Levasseur, supra note 45, at 260 n.4).
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struggle, the fruit of hard labor .... It should be recognized
that there is, within each legal system, a spirit of the
language of the law (which is the reflection of that legal
system). Hence the need (and vision) to admit that in a
language "swarming" in several branches scattered in
various countries, the language of the law flourishes
differently in each of these branches. 57 It is true that it
borrows concepts and rules from other legal systems, but
these borrowings can be made only on the condition that
they are conscious and voluntary. It cannot consist in the
adoption of words which bring with them a content that
was not chosen .... These surreptitious and soft invasions
are the most perverse.
58
Do these reflections on the Civil Law of Louisiana from the
last two centuries find an echo today in both English translations
that were made of the Avant-Projet Catala? We have a translation
in "a swarming language," as Gerard Cornu said, the legal
language of England and English, on the one hand, and on the
other hand, a translation in a "branch" of that language under the
form of the two-centuries old legal English or American legal
English of the State of Louisiana.
5
III. THE AVANT-PROJET CATALA: A CiviL LAW TEXT CONFRONTS
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
The mission entrusted to us60 by the Association Henri
Capitant was to translate into English the articles of the Avant-
Projet Catala. This mission required that we develop a working
method built around well sharpened techniques so as to achieve
what we considered the only acceptable objectives: a translated
civil law text with which a civilian, whatever his location, could
identify in its nature and its spirit. Some of these objectives had
been expressed by Pierre Catala in the overall presentation of the
57. For example, the American common law notion of "detrimental
reliance" is expressed as "efficient breach" in the language of the British
common law.
58. GERARD CORNU, LINGUISTIQUE JURIDIQUE 4-5, 8 (3d ed. 2005) (Fr.)
(trans. from the French by the authors, Alain A. Levasseur and Vicen Feli6).
59. Louisiana has lived for two centuries as an English speaking (and
written) civil law jurisdiction, in contrast with England, the motherland of the
common law in English. See Bulmer v. Bollinger, (1974) 2 C.M.L.R. 91 (Lord
Denning's Bollinger decision contrasting English (common law) and European
(civil law) perspectives).




Projet and by Gdrard Cornu in his Introduction to Book III, Title
III: Obligations. These objectives fit perfectly well with our long
experience as bi-cultural 61 and bilingual62 comparativists immersed
in the mixed legal system of Louisiana for so many years. Were we
as well equipped or better equipped than our colleagues from
England to face the challenge that was presented to all of us under
the same terms and conditions which were actually very simple:
undertake a translation in English of the Avant-Projet Catala. The
differences we are pointing out below between the "British-
English" translation and the "Louisiana-American-English"
translation will help the reader formulate a rational conclusion, so
we hope!
A. The Louisiana Objectives and Working Method
As stated above, some of the objectives for the translation of
the Avant-Projet in many different languages had been identified
by Pierre Catala and Gerard Cornu. Obviously we felt compelled
to make these objectives our own in our translation. However, our
approach to the task was also motivated by objectives which were
not identified in our mind, at first, but which quickly crystallized
when confronted with the use of the language of the common law
to give their authentic meaning to concepts of the civil law. Our
comparative law experience naturally led us to reach for our "civil
law family" to strengthen the ties between its members so that any
"civilian," whether in Latin America or on the European continent,
would easily identify with our translation of civil law concepts in
the English language.
Pierre Catala wrote that the Title "Obligations" must be the
repository of maxims embodying a "jus commune" of the law of
obligations to be found in the specificity of the new particular
codal provisions. Thus, the Code will remain "the natural recourse
for a judge facing the silence of the particular statutes and the
conventions. The Code still is the foundation of our legal mind.,
63
Two goals emerge from this statement: an ugdated "jus commune"
and a common core for our legal reasoning. It is also stated "that
the Avant-Projet does not mean to become a Code breaking with
61. Professors Levasseur and Gruning were educated in France and the
United States.
62. Professor Alain A. Levasseur is actually trilingual; he is also well
versed in the Spanish language.
63. AVANT-PROJET OF THE FRENCH LAW OBLIGATIONS AND THE FRENCH
LAW OF PRESCRIPTIONS 3 (2005).
64. Un droit commun and unfonds commun.
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the past but, rather, to bring an adjustment., 65 Very important for
us was this aim that the Projet intended to bring about adjustments
to the present law of obligations and not to create a break with that
law. We had to be on our guard not to "betray when translating."
66
Echoing this goal by placing it in a broader context, Gerard Cornu
wrote that "the law of contracts demands, in turn, to be merged in
the body of the law to which it belongs. Within the Civil Code, the
recodification of this part is to be made in relationship with the
others, so that consistency will prevail., 67 Gdrard Cornu added that
"the domains of the general theory of law have been approached
with coordination and coherence. This principle of consistency is
the first aspect of their union ... so that . .. in the text, the
concepts of substantive law still re-emerge with the same
meaning." 68 These notions of substantive law that Gerard Cornu
addressed or this "jus commune" and "common" core for our legal
reasoning as Pierre Catala wrote were like an anvil on which we
have hammered our translation projects until finally a unique
"sculpture" or form obtained our approval.
This approval was also conditioned by a reference to two
objectives that we had forged, most likely by a defense reflex, over
the years in this unique laboratory of a mixed legal system, now
200 years old, which is Louisiana. These two objectives had in
common a deeply felt moral obligation. We had to find in the
culture of our legal system the reason and answer for the concepts
of the civil law that had been the fabric of the Louisiana civil law
system since 1808. Since there could not be a rupture or a break
with the past, why not maintain in existence the 200 years of a
Louisiana civil law system, a civil law nearly identical to French
65. AVANT-PROJET, supra note 63, at 4. Of particular note is the word
"rupture" (break) in the original; the new Code of Obligations does not break
with its past. We believe that there is a danger that some concepts of the law of
obligations, when they are translated into a legal language that is foreign to the
civil law and when this foreign legal vocabulary gives that law the legal content
of that foreign vocabulary, could be distorted as to constitute a "break" in their
foreign legal version, with the original legal content of those concepts of the law
of obligations. We will give some examples of this danger below.
66. Following the French adage: traduire c'est trahir ("to translate is to
betray").
67. AVANT-PROJET, supra note 63, at 8. Principally important for a Civilian
is this image that the Civil Code is a unity, a "symphony" in three movements,
or even an "ocean" in which all rivers converge as some Louisiana judges have
written. This unity requires coherence.
68. CORNU, supra note 58, at 13. Below we will illustrate this principle of
consistency and the need for substantive concepts to still have the same meaning
within the examples of solidarity, confusion, term, and condition.
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law and which, besides, enjoyed the added feature of having two
perfectly matched faces: a French one and an English one?
69
It followed that our first objective had been to find "allies"
among "akin" or related legal systems70 in which the Civil Codes
had been written in parallel English-French versions or in which
the law written in the national legal language had been translated
into another legal language, English in particular.' What we were
hoping to find among these "allies" was, of course, uniformity and
consistency in the translations into English of the same concepts
and institutions of the civil law, especially when the civil laws of
our "allies" all converged towards the same origin, the same
source. We were pleased to find that these civil laws, whether
expressed in Spanish, Italian, or French, remained very loyal to
their "common descent" and that their intellectual and spiritual
heritage could be traced back to the same origins easily identifiable
by the same "familial" characteristics. This is particularly true of
some concepts of the civil law that have been carried over in the
Projet and whose "substantial" identity had been translated into
"an" English legal language and not "the" English legal language.
Indeed, the two English translations that were made of the Projet7 2
differ fundamentally in the English vocabulary they use to express
the essence of these concepts or institutions of the civil law. We
will present below some of these concepts to illustrate the
profound differences that are hidden to the unaware reader behind
the artful and subtle choices that translators have to make in their
selection of one word out of many "siblings or relatives."
The Avant-Projet deals with "solidaritO" in its articles 1197 to
1212. This word, "solidarit," is translated in Spanish with the
word "solidaridad' in the Civil Codes of Argentina, Colombia,
and Spain. This same word "solidaritO" is translated in English, in
the official English version of the Civil Code of Qu6bec, by the
word "solidarity., 73 It has always been translated in Louisiana law,





The concept of "confusion" is presented, using this French
word, in articles 1249 and 1250 of the Projet. This same concept
69. See LEVASSEUR WITH FELIU), supra note 18. Moreau Lislet can be
compared, for Louisiana, to Portalis for France.
70. Pierre Catala, Invitation to the Symposium for the Avant-Projet (Apr. 1,
2008).
71. E.g., Quebec.
72. One translation "made in England" and one translation "made in
Louisiana."
73. See, e.g., QUE. CIV. CODE art. 1525 (2009).
74. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1796 (2008).
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appears as "confusi6n" in the Spanish translation, as "confusione"
in the Italian translation of the Projet,75 and under the term
"confusion ' 76 in the English versions of the Civil Codes of Quebec
and Louisiana. 7
The word "terme" in articles 1185 to 1188 of the Avant-Project
becomes a "term" in the English version of the Quebec Civil Code
and in the Louisiana Civil Code. 8 This same word "terme"
becomes "trmino" and "termine" in the Spanish and Italian
translations of the Projet.7 9 The concept known as "compensation"
which is included in articles 1240 to 1247 of the Avant-Projet,
appears under the English word "compensation" in the Civil Codes
of Qudbec and Louisiana.8 0
If our first objective had been to find "allies" in both "pure"
civil law jurisdictions and in "mixed" legal systems, and as we felt
that this objective had been satisfactorily achieved, it still remained
to aim for a second and more ambitious goal well known by most
comparativists: how to reconcile, without any ambiguity and
compromise, the culture of the civil law with a terminology
identified with the common law. Our mandate was to preserve, in
this operation of transposition into an English legal language, the
absolute legal and cultural integrity of the concepts and institutions
of the civil law that the Avant-Projet carried over so as not to cause
a "rupture" or "break" with the past.
In our mind, this second goal or objective was to assist and
encourage two types of legal scholars in their experiencing and
feeling the deep differences in the legal cultures of the civil law
and the common law. First among these legal scholars was the
English speaking scholar capable of reading and understanding the
French language, especially legal French or legal Spanish. Such an
English speaking legal scholar should be able to do research in
French, Spanish, or Qudbecois doctrinal writings as well as in the
reporters of jurisprudence of the same jurisdictions. Thus, if we
translated the word "solidaritg" by "solidarity," this scholar,
starting with his knowledge of that same colloquial English word
but now "legalized" by borrowing the "legal aura" of the civil law
text in which it appears so as to become the legal equivalent of
"solidariti" in the civil law, could very easily find the word
75. AvANT-PROJET, supra note 63, arts. 1249-1250 (Colom.); AVANT-
PROJET, supra note 63, arts. 1249-1250 (Italy).
76. Pronounced with an English or American accent!
77. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1903, 1904; QUt. CIv. CODE arts. 1683, 1685.
78. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1777; Qut. CIV. CODE art. 1508.
79. AVANT-PROJET, supra note 63, art. 1185 (Colom.); AVANT-PROJET,
supra note 63, art. 1185 (Italy).
80. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1893; Qt. CIv. CODE art. 1672.
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"solidarit" in the index of any doctrinal work on French, Spanish,
or Qu6bec law. This scholar's research into French law, for
example, would then be "remotely guided" by one single and same
word, "solidarity," that would lead him to his goal. Likewise, this
same scholar, if he could read Spanish, could find the equivalent of
"solidarity" in the Spanish word "solidaridad' and have access to
the Spanish legal doctrine on the exact same subject. 81
The concept of "confusion" provides another very striking
example. If the French "legal" word "confusion" is translated into
English by "confusion982 and finds its equivalent as "confusi6n" in
a Spanish legal text, our bilingual scholar would encounter no
difficulty in his research. In a sense, he would be taken by the hand
from the beginning of his research and led to the end of it on a
straight line without blind lead, meanders, or endless deviations
and bifurcations.
More importantly for us and of much greater concern was the
second type of legal scholar, the exclusively English speaking
scholar. Assuming that he would be called upon to do research in
the civil law, he could turn only to materials and books written in
the English language. In the absence of books or materials written
directly in English by bilingual or trilingual 83 civilians, this scholar
could possibly have access to English translations of works on the
civil law. 84 However, this raises both an issue about the fidelity of
such translations to the civil law legal culture and a concern about
the liberties that the English translation might have taken to be
appreciated, not to say enjoyed, by an English only reader.
Although not original, this concern must be stressed again. Indeed,
in the operation of translation, the choice between the letter of a
legal text and its spirit results from the constraints of language on
one side and fidelity to the text on the other side. We must respect
both the form and content of the original text. Frangois Gdny wrote
that words in a legal context are almost necessarily an extension of
81. This would not be the case if "solidaritg" were to be translated as "joint
and several" as we explain below since the concept of "solidarity" in the civil
law is very different from the combined or mixed concept of "joint and several"
in the common law.
82. And not "merger," as this word appears in the "English-U.K."
translation of articles 1249 and 1250 of the Avant-Projet Catala. "Merger"
translated into French would be "fusion" as in "fusion de socits" or "merger of
corporations."
83. See generally ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
IN GENERAL, A PRPcis (2006); ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR & DAVID GRUNING,
LOUISIANA LAW OF SALE AND LEASE, A PRjIcIs (2007); SAUL LITvINOFF,
OBLIGATIONS, in 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 2001).
84. See, e.g., LAZARUS, RIPERT, CARBONNIER, AUBRY & RAU, CIVIL LAW
TRANSLATIONS (La. State Law Inst. trans., 1965).
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legal concepts and that lawyers and legal scholars must express the
rules of law in the appropriate words and phrases.
85
Convinced of the "experienced" truthfulness and profound
wisdom of Grny's thoughts, we were committed to cast our
English translation of the Avant-Projet in "an extremely precise
legal language. The law, whose main purpose is to establish a firm
order capable of ensuring all interests, must seize tightly social
realities and contain them in rather firm boundaries to avoid, where
possible, uncertainties and ambiguities. '' 86 In the same vein, we
wanted, in our own way, to answer in our translation of the Projet,
the generic question that Denis Tallon posed in these terms: "how
do we introduce foreign lawyers and legal scholars to one's own
law?" This distinguished comparativist answered his own question
in this way:
One might think that the best method is to grasp the law of
a foreign country directly in the legal literature of this
country and, therefore, in that country's own language.
This is obviously not always possible because to do this it
is necessary to know that language. Furthermore it is not
always desirable, at least not as a first step. The risks of
misunderstanding or misinterpretation are too important.
We must take into account the specificity of the legal
language, often quite distant from the colloquial language.
The perfect mastery of the latter does not ensure the grasp
of the exact meaning of a legal text . . . .The pure and
simple translation of foreign books.., will not do the trick.
... The author (or the translator) must adapt the language
without betraying the substance of the law. The author (or
translator) must strike a delicate balance between a purely
national presentation and a deep integration into the law ad
quem. And here we find the classic question: translate/keep
the term in the language a quo, with an explanation.
87
We were aware throughout our work of translation of the
damage that we could cause to the integrity of the French Civil
Law if it were ever transposed in an English language at odds with
or unsuitable to the legal concepts of the civil law as they were
incorporated in the Avant-Projet. To be faithful to the legal culture
of the civil law, we could not, under cover of the English legal
85. 3 FRANCoIs GENY, SCIENCE ET TECHNIQUE EN DROIT PRIVE POSITIF
448, 454, 459 (1921-1930) (Fr.).
86. Id. at 462.
87. DENIs TALLON, FRAN(AIS JURIDIQUE ET SCIENCE DU DROIT: QUELQUES
OBSERVATIONS 338-49 (1995) (Fr.).
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language, introduce legal concepts of the common law. Should this
happen, we would inevitably be faced with intractable conflicts
between an English legal version only apparently civilian in its
inspiration and on its face, and a translation or a direct writing of
the same text in another form of the English language, but a
translation or a direct writing thoroughly and carefully crafted by a
civilian hand. Furthermore, would it not be a little disconcerting
and detrimental to the uniformity of many concepts of the civil law
if, for example, the translation in the same fundamental text of the
concept of "solidaritM," would become "joint and several" in an
English version and "solidaridad' in a Spanish version? Inevitably,
common law lawyers and scholars would have their own
understanding of this concept since it would be couched in common
law legal terminology, while their civil law counterparts, located in
Argentina for example, would have a very different understanding,
actually the original and only authentic understanding of that
concept.
Another major and subtle danger would be hidden in the
appealing form of a common law doctrine and jurisprudence that
could easily find their credentials in pretending to be the
spokespersons of their civilian peers. They would be assimilated to
their civilian counterparts in the eyes and minds of all those who
could not read the civil law in legal French or legal Spanish or who
could not have access to the legal culture of the civil law. Our
experience with the Louisiana Civil Law enables us to say that
these dangers are not hypothetical, they are real and pernicious. An
illustration can be found in the articles of the Louisiana Civil Code
on "Offenses and Quasi Offenses' '88 or torts. The Civil Code of
Louisiana has always followed the pattern of the articles of the
French Civil Code on civil liability. The English translation of
these articles has preserved the legal concepts of "act" for "fait,"
"faute" became "fault," "garde" became "custody," "negligence"
remained "negligence,, 89 etc. Unfortunately, the dearth, years ago,
of Louisiana Civilian doctrinal work in English or of translations
into English of civil law doctrinal writings resulted in the
Louisiana Civil Code articles on civil liability being absorbed into
the tort law of the common law. As a result, a whole portion of the
Louisiana Civil Code has become a jurisprudential image of the
common law, whereas the "statutory law," the basic code articles
in particular, have remained in their expression pretty much what
they were over the last two centuries.
88. LA. CIV. CODE bk. III, tit. V, ch. 2 (2008).
89. Without the accent on the first "e" as would be required in French.
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B. The Henri Capitant Translation:90 In the Tradition of the Civil
Codes of Louisiana and Quebec
The two major legal traditions, the Roman-Germanic tradition
on one side and the tradition of the common law on the other side,
are distinct from one another by multiple characteristics which can
be traced to their historical origins91 whose line of demarcation
could be identified, somewhat artificially, with the English
Channel.92 As suggested above, there are incompatibilities between
certain fundamental concepts and institutions of the civil law of
obligations, as it is referred to in the civil law tradition, with
concepts and institutions of the "Law of Contracts " the whole
inclusive title generally adopted by the common law.
93
We will look at a few examples of institutions or principles of
the law of conventional obligations that, we believe, will confirm
two things. First, the Avant-Projet Catala and the Civil Codes of
Quebec and Louisiana all belong to the same "traditional" legal
family;94 therefore, the Avant-Projet could not be read and
interpreted in the context of the tradition of the common law as it
does not belong to that legal family. Second, a translation of the
Avant-Projet in legal English must not in any way incorporate
concepts and notions of the common law 95 under the false pretext
that some of the vocabulary of the civil law has no equivalent in
the legal language of the common law. Any translation of the
Avant-Projet must take into account this warning by Pierre Catala:
90. The Louisiana Chapter of the Association Henri Capitant, as the only
English speaking civil law member chapter, was selected to undertake one of the
two translations in English of the Avant Projet. The Association was named
after Henri Capitant, a prominent law professor and scholar of the civil law of
the first half of the twentieth century at the University of Paris, France.
91. On the Common Law and Civil Law in the English language, see JULIO
CUETO-RUA, THE COMMON LAW, ITS NORMATIVE STRUCTURE (1957); MELVIN
A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988); OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881); FREDERICK HENRY LAWSON, A
COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW (1953); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN,
THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF
WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (1985).
92. Isn't it a little curious that on the French side it is called "La Manche"
(or "Sleeve") without any reference to a national identity or claim, while on the
side of the British Isles it is called "The English Channel?"
93. ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, COMPARATIVE LAW OF CONTRACTS, CASES AND
MATERIALS (2008).
94. Catala speaks about "cousins." AVANT-PROJET, supra note 63.
95. Being careful of "false friends": a false parallelism of legal concepts
made by a distorted use of the colloquial language.
740 [Vol. 69
COMPARA TIVISTS BE WARE!
a recent symposium organized by the Law Faculty of the
Universities of Sceaux [has placed] in parallel French law
with the "European principles of contract law" of the
Land6 commission. It could be observed that if, in certain
respects, our [French] law was or could have been
compatible with the framework proposed for Europe, on
other matters this same framework was more at odds with
our national tradition. In the present circumstances, this
should be more thoroughly investigated.
96
The French legal "national tradition," civilian in spirit and
heart, reaffirmed as it is very widely in many concepts of the law
of obligations of the Avant-Projet, must be faithfully reproduced
by the translator. Why, then, not turn towards "law sisters" or "law
cousins" of French law Quebec and Louisiana to benefit from their
history and their experiences as civilian bilingual and bicultural
islands dispersed in an ocean of English Common Law?
Good faith (bonnefoi), as a fundamental principle of the civil
law of obligations, will be our first example of a "false friend., 97
The literal translation of "bonnefoP' in French, is "good faith" in
English. 98 Beyond this translation lies a thoroughly authentic civil
law principle, the essence of which must be communicated to a
common law lawyer. What do these words of article 1104 of the
Avant-Projet mean to that lawyer?
The initiative of the negotiations, their on-going course and
their breach are unrestricted but they must meet the
requirements of good faith. The failure of negotiations can
96. Pierre Catala, Introduction to the Symposium for the Avant-Projet (Apr.
1,2008).
97. On "bonne for' in Civil Law and "good faith" in Common Law, see
Alain A. Levasseur, Contracts: Good Faith, Estoppel .... in COMPARATIVE
LAW OF CONTRACTS 99-122 (2008); Denis Mazeaud, Un droit europden en
quote d'identitg. Les Principes du droit europ~en du contrat, RECUEIL DALLOZ
2959 (2007). On "false friends," see HOUBERT, supra note 23, at 65-69;
Fnac.com, supra note 23.
98. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS (2004)
(speaking about "good faith" here and there in their treatise); GEOFFREY
CHESHIRE, CECIL H. S. FIFOOT & M. P. FURMSTON, CHESHIRE, FIFOOT AND
FURMSTON'S LAW OF CONTRACT 27 (13th ed. 1996) (devoting three quarters of
a page to "Good Faith in Contract Law"); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
(2004) (mentioning "good faith" in conjunction with "fair dealing"); GUENTER
HEINZ TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT (7th ed. 1987) (failing to cite "good
faith" in the index). "Good faith" is the object of article 1759 of the Civil Code
of Louisiana and of article 1375 of the Civil Code of Qudbec. LA. CIv. CODE art.
1759 (2008); QLu. CIV. CODE art. 1375 (2009).
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be a ground for liability only if it can be attributed to the
bad faith or the fault of one of the parties.
We read in the presentation of the Projet that "a duty of loyalty,
implied or expressed, crosses throughout the subject of
obligations." In his Introduction to Title HI-On Obligations,
Gerard Comu wrote that "all these advances made by contractual
justice carry with them-it is an active correlation-a greater
influence of good faith. The favor given to good faith circulates
throughout the text. Freedom in probity, the motto comes from a
high tradition." We can only be impressed by the power and the
emphasis of the words of Grard Comu culminating in the choice
words of "high civil law tradition!" The Louisiana Civil Code
makes a "General Principle" out of "good faith," a general
principle of the law of obligations.99 The same is true of the Civil
Code of Quebec which, under the titles "Obligations in General"
and "General Dispositions' ' 00 states that "la bonne foi doit
gouverner la conduite des parties . . ." and, in a parallel English
version, "the parties shall conduct themselves in good faith ...
.,,101 In the framework proposed for Europe, 102 under the form of
"Principles of European Contract Law,"' 0 we find that a "general
duty" is imposed on "each party to act in accordance with the
requirements of good faith" and the parties are forbidden to
exclude or limit this duty.104
Apparently a translator should have no problem in translating
"bonnefoi" with "good faith," and the common law lawyer should
feel at ease in discussing this concept with his civilian colleagues
while negotiating a contract. However, very soon the two lawyers
will realize that the English language and the common law have
misled them. Indeed, one can read a comment and a note under
article 1:201 of the Principles of European Contract law; they read
"In English, good faith means a state of mind: the will to act
honestly and fairly; it is a subjective concept .... Fair dealing
means to act with loyalty; this is an objective criterion ..... Pierre
Catala spoke of a "duty of loyalty," and Gerard Comu spoke of the
greater influence of good faith. Hence the difficulty, if not
impossibility, for our two lawyers to come to the same
understanding because the common law makes a distinction
99. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1759. Good faith shall govern the conduct of the
obligor and the obligee in whatever pertains to the obligations.
100. In French: Des Obligations en Gdndral et Dispositions Gdndrales.
101. Qut.CIV. CODE art. 1375.
102. CATALA, supra note 2, at 2.
103. Id.
104. See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW art. 1:201 (2003).
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between "good faith" and "fair dealing," while in the French Civil
Law tradition the principle of "good faith" is more the equivalent of
the "duty of loyalty," therefore "fair dealing" in the common law.
The note under this same article 1:201 adds, in the same vein, that
the principle of good faith is recognized or at least observed
in all countries of the European Union as setting a standard
pattern of contractual behavior. There is a considerable
difference, however, between the different legal systems as
regards the extent and degree of penetration of this
principle. An extreme situation is created by those systems
(English and Irish) that do not recognize a general duty for
the parties to comply with good faith but which, in many
cases, reach, by means of special rules, results which are
imposed by good faith .... The common law of England
and Ireland recognizes no general obligation to act in
accordance with the requirements of good faith in the
performance of contracts.
°5
Should we, then, translate the "bonne foi" of the Civilian by
"good faith and fair dealing" of the common law to be sure to
communicate the full cultural content of the concept of good faith?
Any translator, even if he is also a bicultural comparativist, will
not always be in a position to make a reader of a certain legal
tradition feel all the cultural subtleties of certain concepts,
principles, and institutions of another legal tradition. The cultural
environment of the Civilian can not always be transported into
another cultural environment by the vocabulary of this other
environment. That is the reason why the English language shaped
by the civil law cultures of Quebec and Louisiana can be used
without any concern or betrayal in the State of Louisiana and the
Province of Qudbec.106
The importance of this concept of good faith from a cultural
civil law point of view requires that we make some additional
comments on "good faith" in the common law tradition. The
English authors, Cheshire and Fifoot, only spend three quarters of
a page on "good faith" and begin by asking this question: "Do the
parties owe each other a duty to negotiate in good faith? ... [D]o
they have to execute the contract in good faith?"' 7 Their response,
105. Id. at 74-78.
106. As Louisiana lawyers and legal scholars, we were, even if this image is
simplistic, "like fish in the water" in our translation of the Projet. Talking about
"fish in water" isn't it interesting that in English "poisson rouge" (redfish) is
translated as goldfish ("poisson d'or")?
107. CHESHIRE ET AL., supra note 98, at 27.
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as short as their treatment of good faith, is the following: "Until
recently, English lawyers would have not even asked these
questions or, if they were asked, they would have responded
somewhat cavalierly 'of course not."1
08
In Treitel's Law of Contract, good faith is not even listed in the
Index. 10 9 On the U.S. side, the UCC has a different approach of the
common law as Section 1-203 states: "Every contract or duty
within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance of enforcement." 110 The same is true of the
Restatement of the Law of Contracts in Section 205. The great
American comparativist, who left us recently, Allan Farnsworth,
wrote that the
concept of good faith plays a fundamental role in the
contract law of the civil legal system . . . . English law,
unlike the "Civilians", categorically refuses to recognize
such a duty of good faith. The "common lawyers" at the
UNCITRAL"'1 meeting on the Vienna Convention,
uncomfortable with the rather vague and broad concept of
good faith of the civilians in the performance of a contract,
refused to include in the text of the convention a provision
which required good faith in the performance of obligations
in the Vienna Convention. The Civilians held their ground,
determined to defend their point of view and Article 7,
Chapter II of the Convention does impose an obligation of
good faith in international business transactions.112
The second example of a French Civil Law concept that will
hold our attention is that of "violence" as a vice of consent. As in
the French Civil Code, 1 13 the Civil Code of Quebec uses the same
concept under the same word in French, "violence."'" 4 In the
English version of the same article of the Qu6bec Civil Code, we
read the word "violence." There is, therefore, identity in the use of
the same word "violence" in the two languages. Was this literal
translation also a transposition of this same concept of "violence"
identifiable with the civilian legal tradition and the French legal
system into the legal tradition of the common law identified with
108. Id.
109. TREITEL, supra note 98.
110. U.C.C. § 1-203 (2004).
111. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
112. E. Allan Farnsworth, A Common Lawyer's View of His Civilian
Colleagues, 57 LA. L. REv. 227 (1996).
113. C. CIV. arts. 1109, llllpassim (Fr.).
114. QU. CIV. CODE art. 1402.
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English law? Would a common law lawyer be able to grasp the full
cultural content of this civil law concept?
As we have stated before, the French and English versions of
the Louisiana Civil Codes of 1808 and 1825 used the same word
"violence" to convey the same basic concept. In 1984, the
Louisiana Legislature, on the recommendation of a committee of
lawyers and legal scholars, chose to substitute the English word
"duress" for the French and English word "violence" prevailing in
Louisiana since 1808. With this name change, the vice of consent
previously known in Louisiana as "violence" also changed in legal
content. A new concept, that of the common law "duress," entered
Louisiana Civil Law. ' If the word "violence" in article 1114 of
the Projet was to be translated by "duress," and only "duress," the
reader, unaware of the original and cultural meaning of this word,
would be misled because he would consider the two concepts of
"violence" and "duress" as identical. We are going back to Gdrard
Cornu, who said, "Yes, we can borrow concepts and rules from
other legal systems, but on condition that these borrowings be fully
conscious and voluntary. We should not adopt words that drag
with them a background that we have not chosen."' 1 6 None of the
three works on the English law of contracts we have consulted
mention the word "violence."11 7 "Violence" does not appear either
in the few works of American law of contracts that we have
consulted. 118 These books, English and American, deal instead
with "duress"! We read that this concept has evolved in recent
decades from dealing with the use of force or the threat of the use
of force with intent to cause physical injury to the person of one of
the contracting parties, to include threats, illegal of course, to cause
economic or financial harm to the other party. The essential
component to the concept of duress is the use of physical force or
115. Did Louisiana lawmakers believe there was equivalence or identity in
the legal concepts of "violence" and "duress"? A commentary written, in our
opinion, either in bad faith or in total ignorance of the difference in the legal
content of each of these concepts tries to convince the reader that the word
"duress" is a "word of art" which has exactly the same meaning as "violence." If
the substitution of one word for another does not change the legal content of
these words, why then the substitution? Because the word "violence," if it exists
in spoken and written English, does not exist in the legal vocabulary of the
common law?
116. CORNU, supra note 58, at 8.
117. See supra note 98.
118. BRIAN A. BLUM, CONTRACTS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS (3d ed.
2004); JOHN D. CALAMARI, JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN H. BENDER, CASES
AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2004); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 7 CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS (2002). FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, § 4.9 passim (addressing
"duress," but not "violence").
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threats to use physical force; it is this element, called coercion in
the common law, which must intimidate one of the contracting
parties, so that he is aware that he is entering the contract under the
influence of fear and not as a result of error or mistake." 9 Thus,
"duress" does not include situations that, under French law, would
be described as "moral evil" or "moral constraint" as is the case of
"persons who, either naturally or due to some circumstances, have
a particular weakness and can easily become victims of
unscrupulous contractors."' 20 It became incumbent upon the courts
of Equity to create the concept of "undue influence"' 2 1 so as to
take into account situations in which there was no threat of
physical force but simply a power of persuasion by a party on the
other because of a position of economic dependency of one on the
other or a position of dominance of one over the other.
IV. CONCLUSION
History tells us that the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 was only
four years younger than its worldwide known "cousin," the French
Civil Code of 1804. For 200 years, the French language and the
French Civil Law all surrounded the "Code Napoldon" with
prestige, fame, and influence while the Louisiana Civil Code was
waging a series of battles on different fronts to ensure the survival
of the civil law culture it embodied and had inherited from Spain
and France. Is it not a strange and paradoxical turn of historical
events that, today, this "younger cousin" of the French Civil Code
119. The Dictionary of English Law says that:
Duress is where a man is compelled to do an act by injury, beating or
unlawful imprisonment or by the threat of being killed, suffering some
grievous bodily harm, or being unlawfully imprisoned .... Strictly speaking,
there is no such thing as duress to the goods or property of a person.
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW (Earl Jowitt et al. eds., 1959).
In Black's Law Dictionary, duress is defined as:
strictly, the physical confinement of a person or the detention of a
contracting party's property; ... the use or threatened use of unlawful
force to compel someone to commit an unlawful act. The concept of
moral duress is described as: an unlawful coercion to perform by
unduly influencing or taking advantage of the weak financial position
of another.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 545 (8th ed. 2004).
120. 1 JACQUES FLOUR, JEAN-LUC AUBERT & ERIC SAVAUX, LES
OBLIGATIONS: L'ACTE JURIDIQUE 151 (9th ed. 2000).
121. BLUM, supra note 116, § 13.10; TREITEL, supra note 98, at 314-15
("Equity gives relief on the ground of undue influence where an agreement has
been obtained by certain kinds of improper pressure which were thought not to
amount to duress at common law because no element of violence to the person
was involved.").
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has turned to its benefit 200 years of the use of the English
language, albeit the language of the common law also, to become
the only English speaking civil law jurisdiction with a "Civil Code
directly written in English?" Would Napol6on be proud to witness
the American-Louisianan "cousin" of "his" French civil code use
the language of his major enemy and victor on the battlefields
making sure that "his" code will never die but live forever?
122
122. Alain Levasseur, Code Napolgon or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV. 762
(1969).
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